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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Donald P. Boyle Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia courts and the General Assembly have effected a
number of changes in civil practice and procedure during the
past year. This article focuses on some significant developments
of interest to the general litigation attorney.
II. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA,
VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURTS, AND FEDERAL COURTS APPLYING
VIRGINIA LAW
A. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Service of Process
1. Removal
In Burroughs v. Palumbo,' defendant was served with pro-
cess through the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The grounds
of defense was due to be filed on September 22, 1994. On Sep-
tember 29, 1994, defendant filed the notice of removal in feder-
al court. On September 30, 1994, the state court entered de-
fault judgment against defendant. Later that same day, defen-
dant filed the notice of removal with the state court. Between
the time that defendant filed the notice of removal in federal
court and the time that he filed it with the state court, both
courts had jurisdiction over the case; therefore the default judg-
ment was valid. The federal court set aside the default judg-
ment, however, on the grounds that defendant was out of town
* Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va.; BA., 1984, University of Vir-
ginia; J.D., 1989, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
1. 871 F. Supp. 870, 871 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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when process reached his home and that he did not return
until September 23, 1994.2
2. Venue
Section 8.01-262 does not specify whether the relevant place
where "the defendant resides or has his principal place of em-
ployment" for purposes of Category B venue is to be determined
as of the time of filing or as of the time of the accrual of the
cause of action.3 Relying on federal cases,4 the Circuit Court
for the City of Richmond held that section 8.01-262 refers to
the residence or workplace of the defendant at the time of filing
of the action.5
B. Causes of Action and Damages
1. Acts of Third Persons
In Nasser v. Parker,6 the supreme court refused to impose
liability on a psychiatrist and a hospital for failure to warn a
woman that the psychiatrist's patient intended to cause her
harm. Plaintiff alleged liability based on a "special relation"
between defendants and the patient as described in sec-
tion 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.7 Such liability
only exists, however, if a defendant "takes charge" of the assail-
ant.8 The psychiatrist and the hospital did not "take charge" of
the patient so that liability could be imposed on them for the
patient's actions.9
2. Id. at 872-73.
3. VA- CODE ANN. § 8.01-262 (1994).
4. See Tenefrancia v. Robinson Corp., 921 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1990).
5. Godsey v. Maitland, 34 Va. Cir. 262 (Richmond City 1994).
6. 249 Va. 172, 455 S.E.2d 502 (1995).
7. Id. at 176, 455 S.E.2d at 503. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a)
(1964).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1964).
9. Nasser, 249 Va. at 181, 455 S.E.2d at 506. The court criticized Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), for failing to recognize the ef-
fect of § 319 on "special relation" claims. Nasser, 249 Va. at 179, 455 S.E.2d at 505.
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2. Automobile Accidents-Sudden Emergency
In Bentley v. Felts,0 Felts ran a stop sign at an intersection,
causing Bentley to swerve into a guard rail to avoid Felts. The
evidence showed that Felts's engine had unexpectedly stalled,
causing a loss of power to the power-assisted brakes." Felts
argued that the engine cut-off constituted a "sudden emergency"
to which he responded as a reasonable person under the cir-
cumstances. The trial court granted an appropriate instruc-
tion.' The supreme court held that this was error:
A sudden emergency presupposes a happening which, in
the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances,
cannot be foreseen or expected. See Garnot v. Johnson, 239
Va. 81, 86, 387 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1990) (sudden emergency
instruction improper where vehicle in front of defendant
stopped suddenly on highway). Automobile engines do occa-
sionally cut off without warning, thereby requiring the
operators to use increased brake force to stop cars equipped
with power-assisted brakes. Accordingly, automobile opera-
tors should anticipate this eventuality and be prepared to
use increased force on the brakes. Thus, Felts's loss of pow-
er-assisted braking was not a sudden emergency as we have
defined and applied that term. 3
3. Common Carrier
The Supreme Court of Virginia has said that "[a] common
carrier [is] defined as one who, by virtue of his calling and as a
regular business, undertakes for hire to transport persons or
commodities from place to place, offering his services to all such
as may choose to employ him and pay his charges."'4 In Bregel
10. 248 Va. 117, 445 S.E.2d 131 (1994).
11. Id. at 118, 445 S.E.2d at 132.
12. Id. at 119-20, 445 S.E.2d at 133-34.
13. Id. at 120-21, 445 S.E.2d at 133-34. Justices Compton, Lacy, and Keenan dis-
sented. They reasoned that an engine cut-off is considerably more unusual than the
sudden stop of a preceding vehicle. Id. at 122, 445 S.E.2d at 134-35. (Lacy, J., dis-
senting in part).
14. Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va. 521, 527, 88 S.E. 174, 176 (1916) (quoting Black's
Law Dictionary); see also BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 214 (6th ed. 1990).
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v. Busch Entertainment Corp.,5 plaintiff was injured while on
the Skyride, a monocable system that transports patrons
around the park at Busch Gardens. The Skyride, which offers
patrons an aerial view of the park, is for entertainment purpos-
es; the transportation function is incidental to the entertain-
ment function. 6 The trial court properly refused a common
carrier instruction.'
4. Conspiracy
The supreme court rejected the argument that the Virginia
Conspiracy Statute" requires proof of actual malice. Instead,
the Act only requires proof of legal malice, i.e., that defendant
"acted intentionally, purposely, and without lawful justifica-
tion."9 In Saliba v. Exxon Corp.,20 a federal district court rea-
soned that a single entity cannot conspire with itself. A corpo-
ration, therefore, cannot be held liable under the Virginia Con-
spiracy Statute for conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary.
5. Contracts
a. Consideration
A debtor's promise to pay sums already due is not sufficient
consideration to support a creditor's agreement to refinance the
loan." In addition, a debtor's failure to seek financing else-
where does not supply the necessary consideration for a
creditor's agreement to refinance a defaulted loan."
Mere forbearance, without an agreement to that effect, is not
sufficient consideration for a promise, even though the fact of
forbearance was induced by the promise. 3 The fact of forbear-
15. 248 Va. 175, 176, 444 S.E.2d 718, 719 (1994).
16. Id. at 177, 444 S.E.2d at 719.
17. Id. at 177, 444 S.E.2d at 720.
18. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499, -500 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
19. Commercial Business Sys. v. Bellsouth Servs., Inc., 249 Va. 39, 47, 453 S.E.2d
261, 267 (1995).
20. 865 F. Supp. 306, 313 (W.D. Va. 1994).
21. Albright v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co., 249 Va. 463, 466, 457 S.E.2d
776, 778 (1995).
22. Id.
23. Greenwood Assocs., Inc. v. Crestar Bank, 248 Va. 265, 269, 448 S.E.2d 399,
900
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ance to act does not establish consideration for the undertaking
unless there was an agreement, express or implied, that the
plaintiff would forbear to act.' "Such an agreement is abso-
lutely essential."25 In Greenwood Associates, Inc. v. Crestar
Bank, plaintiff failed to plead such an agreement, and thus the
trial court's judgment dismissing this count of the bill of com-
plaint was proper."
b. Good-Faith Covenant
In Mahoney v. NationsBank of Virginia, NA.," the supreme
court held that section 8.1-203' does not imply a good-faith
covenant into commercial contracts. The court followed cases
from other jurisdictions that have rejected the notion of a good-
faith covenant based on section 1-203 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.29 Instead, when the parties to a contract have creat-
ed "valid and binding rights," a party cannot breach any duty
of good faith by exercising those contractual rights."
402 (1994).
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Saunders v. Bank of Mecklenberg, 112 Va. 443, 454, 71 S.E. 714,
717 (1911)).
26. Id.
27. 249 Va. 216, 221, 455 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1995).
28. "Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-203 (1991).
29. See, e.g., Nantahala Village, Inc. v. NCNB National Bank, 976 F.2d 876, 881
(4th Cir. 1992); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 674 (2d
Cir. 1985); Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 739 (9th Cir.
1985); Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982);
Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
30. Mahoney, 249 Va. at 220, 455 S.E.2d at 8.
Also applying this rule was Albright v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co.,
249 Va. 463, 457 S.E.2d 776 (1995). Plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its
"obligations to act in good faith in contracting" by foreclosing on a secured loan and
suing plaintiff for the balance due on an unsecured note. Defendant had a contractual
right to do this, however, and there can be no breach of Code § 8.1-203 in enforcing
a contractual right. Id. at 467, 457 S.E.2d at 778.
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c. Impossibility
In Long Signature Homes, Inc. v. Fairfield Woods, Inc.,3" the
parties entered into a contract for the sale of 382 building lots
to be used for a subdivision. The contract was contingent upon
the purchaser's receiving certification from county authorities
for adequate water, sewer, and electric facilities.3 2 The county
did not provide the certification, and the seller refused to per-
form beyond the fifty lots already sold on the grounds that it
was impossible to perform the contract. 3 Ordinarily, a super-
vening condition that renders a promisor's performance tempo-
rarily impossible will not release him from the duty of perform-
ing, but will only suspend that obligation.' This general rule
is inapplicable, however, if the delay will make the promisor's
performance materially more burdensome. "In that instance, the
promisor's duty of performance is discharged rather than sus-
pended."35 Nevertheless, this rule is subject to contrary agree-
ment by the parties.3' Here, the contract provided that the
purchaser could delay the date for closing until sixty days after
the contingency is satisfied. The trial court was ordered to
enter a declaratory judgment that the contract is still in effect
and will remain effective until the expiration of the twenty-one
year period of the rule against perpetuities.37
d. Modification
In Powell Mountain Joint Venture v. Moore,8 the parties
had a contract to sublease certain coal lands. The contract
provided for two six-month extensions, if Powell Mountain gave
notice within thirty days of the scheduled expiration of the
agreement. Powell Mountain properly gave notice of the first
31. 248 Va. 95, 96, 445 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1994).
32. Id. at 97, 445 S.E.2d at 490.
33. Id. at 97-98, 445 S.E.2d at 491.
34. Id. at 99, 445 S.E.2d at 491 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
269 (1981)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 269 cmt. a (1981)).
37. Id. at 99-100, 445 S.E.2d at 492.
38. 248 Va. 63, 64, 445 S.E.2d 135, 136 (1994).
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six-month extension. 9 On July 6, 1990, within the thirty-day
period for the second extension, counsel for Powell Mountain
proposed certain modifications to the agreement before agreeing
to a new extension. Counsel for the Moores did not respond. On
July 26, 1990, still within the thirty-day period, Powell Moun-
tain gave notice of its election to extend the agreement, not-
withstanding the earlier letter. The court held that Powell
Mountain could propose a modification without forfeiting its
right to extend," A modification cannot occur without the ex-
press mutual agreement of the parties. "[W]hen one party
claims that the other party has surrendered a right guaranteed
by the contract, the party asserting such [surrender] must
prove either passage of valuable consideration, estoppel in pais,
or waiver of the right."4 None was shown here.
e. Performance
In Lenders Financial Corp. v. Talton,42 plaintiff filed a mo-
tion for judgment alleging breach of a "finders fee agreement"
relating to obtaining financing for defendant's real estate devel-
opment. A loan was obtained, but defendant refused to pay.'
At trial, defendant moved to strike plaintiff's evidence on the
grounds that plaintiff had not made a prima facie showing of
its own performance of the agreement.44 The supreme court
held that the trial court properly denied the motion.45 The lan-
guage of the agreement, when viewed in the light most favor-
able to plaintiff, covered the type of loan that defendant re-
ceived.' Further, because defendant's repudiation of this exec-
utory contract constituted an anticipatory breach, plaintiff could
sue on the contract without waiting for the time of defendant's
performance to arrive.
39. Id. at 65, 445 S.E.2d at 136-37.
40. Id. at 66, 445 S.E.2d at 137.
41. Id. (quoting Stanley's Cafeteria v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 73, 306 S.E.2d 870,
873 (1983)).
42. 249 Va. 182, 183, 455 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1995).
43. Id. at 186, 455 S.E.2d at 235.
44. Id. at 187, 455 S.E.2d at 235.
45. Id. at 187-88, 455 S.E.2d at 235-36.
46. Id. at 188-89, 455 S.E.2d at 236.
47. Id. at 189, 455 S.E.2d at 236.
1995] 903
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:897
f. Standing
In Cottrell v. General Systems Software Corp.,' the court
considered the question of when a corporation has standing to
sue for breach of contract. General Systems Software was incor-
porated in 1983. In 1988, William J. Kenney, the corporation's
president, allowed the corporation to dissolve by operation of
law. In 1989, the State Corporation Commission issued a notice
of termination of corporate existence to General Systems. On
March 6, 1991, Kenney signed a contract for the sale of proper-
ty that had been purchased by General Systems in 1986. The
contract of purchase stated that it was "between William J.
Kenney, Jr. (the 'Seller,' whether one or more), and David E.
[and] Christine G. Cottrell (the 'Purchaser,' whether one or
more)."49 The Cottrells did not close on the property, and Gen-
eral Systems sold the property to other buyers for $47,500 less
than the price provided in the contract with the Cottrells.0
General Systems sued the Cottrells for breach of contract and
recovered $44,650 in a trial before the chancellor.5 The su-
preme court reversed on the grounds that General Systems was
not a party to the contract. The "clear language of the contract"
identified Kenney as the seller and the Cottrells as the pur-
chasers. Although Kenney signed as 'William Kenney, Jr., pres.
for General Systems Software," this did not alter the language
of the contract identifying Kenney as the seller.52
g. Third-Party Beneficiary
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fireguard Corp.," the
contract between Cranshaw, the general contractor, and
Fireguard, a subcontractor, provided that Fireguard would in-
demnify "the Owner" and the "Contractor" (Cranshaw) against
damage, loss, claims, suits, actions, expense, liability, or obliga-
48. 248 Va. 401, 402, 448 S.E.2d 421, 422 (1994).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 402-03, 448 S.E.2d at 422-23.
52. Id. at 403, 448 S.E.2d at 422-23.
53. 249 Va. 209, 211, 455 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1995).
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tion of any kind by reason of or arising from any actions of
Fireguard, its agents, employees, or subcontractors. After
Fireguard's negligent testing of a fire pump system that it in-
stalled on the project caused extensive water damage, Quincy,
the owner of the project, and Aetna, its insurer, sued Fireguard
on a third-party beneficiary theory. Fireguard filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the contract referred to anoth-
er party, not Quincy, as the "Owner."54 The court held that it
was clear that the parties intended to confer a benefit on the
"Owner," but it was not clear who they meant. The trial court
therefore was not justified in holding, as a matter of law, that
Quincy was not the "Owner.""5
6. Corporate Veil
In Sloan v. Thornton," the jury was instructed that in order
to impose liability on a shareholder for the debts of the corpora-
tion, the plaintiff had the burden to prove that the corporation
was a sham and was either the alter ego of the shareholder or
was used to disguise a wrong or obscure a fraud of the share-
holder. Plaintiff introduced no evidence that the corporation
was a sham or that it had been used to disguise a wrong or to
obscure a fraud. Therefore, the trial court correctly set aside
the verdict for plaintiff.
7. Damages
a. Evidence
In Stohlman v. S & B Ltd. Partnership," Stohlman entered
into a lease of property owned by S & B for use as an auto
dealership. When the building was eighty-five percent complet-
ed, Stohlman refused to go forward with the lease. The proper-
ty eventually was sold because of a failure to find a new ten-
ant. At trial in this declaratory judgment action, Stohlman
moved for judgment on the grounds that S & B had not proved
54. Id. at 214, 455 S.E.2d at 231.
55. Id. at 215, 455 S.E.2d at 232.
56. 249 Va. 492, 457 S.E.2d 60 (1995).
57. 249 Va. 251, 252, 454 S.E.2d 923, 924 (1995).
1995] 905
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its damages because it had not introduced evidence of the fair
market value of the premises "ready to go and functional" on
the date of the breach.5" The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's denial of Stohlman's motion. S & B showed that it was
unable to lease the property and that the real estate market
had substantially declined. This was sufficient to make a prima
facie case that the lease had no apparent market value on the
date of the breach.59 Stohlman had the burden of going for-
ward to show that the cost of completing the building
($950,000) would have been a reasonable effort to limit damag-
es. Stohlman produced no such evidence."
In Estate of Taylor v. Flair Property Associates,6 Taylor sold
two parcels of undeveloped land to Flair. The parties amended
their agreement to state that Flair would provide sewer service
to the properties in exchange for Taylor's reduction of the sale
price by $60,000. Flair never made these improvements, and
Taylor sued for breach of contract."2 Taylor introduced no evi-
dence of its damages in its case in chief, but had Flair's expert
testify on cross-examination regarding his estimate of $63,600
for the work. The supreme court held that Taylor could not rely
on the $60,000 figure absent an agreement on liquidated dam-
ages. The evidence from Flair's expert, however, was sufficient
proof of Taylor's damages to survive a motion to strike.6'
b. New Business
In Commercial Business Systems v. Bellsouth Services, Inc.,"
plaintiff sued defendant for failure to renew its contract to
repair Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) equipment. Plain-
tiff based its damage estimate on the repair records of the
company that defendant used instead of plaintiff during the
two-year contract period.65 This did not violate the "new busi-
58. Id. at 253, 454 S.E.2d at 925.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 256, 454 S.E.2d at 926.
61. 248 Va. 410, 412, 448 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1994).
62. Id. at 412, 448 S.E.2d at 415.
63. Id. at 413, 448 S.E.2d at 416.
64. 249 Va. 39, 453 S.E.2d 261 (1995).
65. Id. at 49, 453 S.E.2d at 268.
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ness" rule because plaintiff was an established business with a
prior record of repairing defendant's equipment.66
c. Punitive Damages
In Hamilton Development Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc.,7
plaintiff sued defendant for trespass on a .176-acre parcel. The
jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $20,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. An
award of punitive damages must be supported by evidence of
"misconduct or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence
as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others."6" In
this case, there was credible evidence to support the jury's
punitive award:
Twelve months before the trespass, defendant's principals
had been warned that the plaintiff owned the property
necessary to "square up" the lot Hodges wanted for his per-
sonal use. Nevertheless, determined to "get it from whoever
owned it," defendant's principals arranged to acquire
plaintiff's land, without performing a title examination, by
use of another corporation controlled by them. Subsequent-
ly, and after ignoring another notice that plaintiff owned
the subject property, defendant committed the trespass.
This conduct demonstrates that defendant acted with such
recklessness or negligence to evince conscious disregard of
plaintiffs property rights.69
The court also held that the award was not excessive, where
defendant recklessly caused plaintiff $20,000 in actual damages
and, during the year of the trespass, defendant had total in-
come of approximately $1.2 million and defendant's two princi-
pals received approximately $670,160 in distributions from the
corporation."°
66. Id. at 50, 454 S.E.2d at 268-69.
67. 248 Va. 40, 445 S.E.2d 140 (1994).
68. Id at 45, 445 S.E.2d at 143 (quoting Giant of Va., Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679,
685, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1967)).
69. 1&
70. Id. at 46, 445 S.E.2d at 144.
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d. Stigma
In Adams v. Star Enterprise,' plaintiffs sought compensa-
tion for diminution in their property value that they alleged
was caused by defendants' oil spill. None of the oil made con-
tact with plaintiffs' property.12 Under Virginia law, such "stig-
ma" damages are not recoverable without a physical impact,
whether under a nuisance or a negligence theory."3
8. Defamation
a. Defamation Per Se
In Schnupp v. Smith, Schnupp, a police officer, reported to
Smith's supervisor the following:
[An ARA] van license LKA 792 with... Andre L. Smith
[driving] was seen at 3:25 p.m. at a high profile drug area
on 900 North 26th Street. He was observed pulling up to
that location and a passenger got out of passenger side
went up to this location gave people something and received
something in return, then this person known as Robert B.
Regan [sic], Jr., got back in the van and they drove by the
officer.'4
The trial court instructed the jury to return their verdict for
Smith if Smith proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Schnupp made or implied this statement. 5 Schnupp argued
that the statement did not qualify as defamation per se because
it did not impute to Smith the commission of a crime of moral
turpitude for which Smith could be indicted and punished. 6
The supreme court disagreed. The crime alleged need not be
one involving moral turpitude, but only one that is "punishable
by imprisonment in a state or federal institution."77 Smith
71. 51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 421.
73. Id. at 422-25.
74. 249 Va. 353, 359, 457 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1995).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 359-60, 457 S.E.2d at 45-46.
77. See Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 147, 334 S.E.2d
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claimed that the statement imputed the crime of aiding and
abetting in the possession of narcotics, which is punishable by
imprisonment under Virginia law.78 The court also rejected
Schnupp's assertion that the defamatory words must be suffi-
cient in themselves to establish all the elements of the crime. It
is enough if the crime may be reasonably inferred from the
words used. 9
b. Sexual Harassment
Williams v. Garraghty" presented an unusual set of facts.
Gloria Williams worked for David Garraghty, a prison warden.
The two saw each other from 1982 to 1986. After Williams
became engaged to another man, her personal relationship with
Garraghty ended. Williams alleged that Garraghty continued to
make amorous advances to her in 1986-88 and 1992. She wrote
him a memorandum describing her view of the facts and accus-
ing him of sexual harassment. An investigation followed, and
Garraghty was terminated. Garraghty sued Williams for defa-
mation. The jury returned a verdict for Garraghty in the
amount of $152,597 in compensatory damages and $125,000 in
punitive damages.8'
Williams asserted on appeal that she had a qualified privi-
lege under federal law to report sexual harassment and that
the trial court erred in refusing her proffered instruction on
this point.82 The supreme court disagreed with Williams. There
is no such qualified privilege in a state action for defamation.'
846, 850 (1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1976)).
78. Schnupp, 249 Va. at 359, 457 S.E.2d at 45.
79. Id. at 360-61, 457 S.E.2d at 46.
80. 249 Va. 224, 455 S.E.2d 209 (1995).
81. Id. at 227-31, 455 S.E.2d at 212-14.
82. Id. at 234, 455 S.E.2d at 215-16.
83. Id. at 234, 455 S.E.2d at 216. The court also held that Garraghty's claims for
"personal damages" for defamation and emotional distress were not within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act because Garraghty had not sus-
tained an "injury by accident." Id. at 238, 455 S.E.2d at 218.
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9. Detinue
Virginia's detinue statutes do not authorize and require a
sheriff to break and enter a dwelling house, without the
occupant's permission, for the purpose of seizing personal
property pretrial. Such action was forbidden by the common
law, and the General Assembly has not seen fit to abrogate this
common law principle by statute."
10. Insurance85
a. Automobile-Consent Judgment
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Eades," the insurer de-
nied coverage to the defendant in an action arising out of an
automobile accident. The defendant in the accident case then
entered into a consent judgment with the personal injury plain-
tiff. After the defendant assigned plaintiff her rights against
the insurer, the plaintiff filed an action against the insurer
seeking indemnification." The insurer argued that the consent
judgment was the result of fraud and collusion. The supreme
court held that the consent judgment was not subject to collat-
eral attack.88
b. Automobile-Construction of Terms
In Moore v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 9
plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a "family-class
stock car" at a race track. Plaintiffs insurance policy with State
Farm covered reasonable medical expenses incurred "through
being struck by an automobile or by a trailer of any type" but
excluded coverage for injuries sustained "through being struck
84. See Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 448 S.E.2d 625 (1994).
85. For a more detailed discussion of changes in insurance law see E. Lewis
Kincer, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Insurance Law, 29 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1089
(1995).
86. 248 Va. 285, 448 S.E.2d 631 (1994).
87. Id. at 289, 448 S.E.2d at 632.
88. Id. at 289, 448 S.E.2d at 633.
89. 248 Va. 432, 448 S.E.2d 611 (1994).
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by ... a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use
principally off public roads, while not upon public roads.""
When State Farm denied plaintiff's claim, plaintiff sued for
breach of the policy terms. The trial court found the policy
language unambiguous and ruled that the modified Chevrolet
Nova that struck plaintiff, which had no headlights or tail-
lights, no muffler, no turn signals, no side mirrors, and no
working emergency brake was "equipment designed for use
principally off public roads."9
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. To bar coverage,
exclusionary policy language must clearly bring the particular
event, thing, or circumstances in question within its scope.92
The car that struck plaintiff was not "a farm type tractor or
other equipment designed for use principally off public
roads."9 3 The vehicle was not so altered as not to be an "auto-
mobile" within the policy definition.94
c. Automobile-Underinsured Motorist-Stacking
In order to determine whether a motor vehicle is "underin-
sured," the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage avail-
able on all policies applicable to the plaintiff must be compared
to the coverage on such vehicle.95
d. Automobile-Uninsured Motorist
An unusual situation, but one that the supreme court had
previously encountered, was involved in Erie Insurance Co.
Exchange v. Jones." In Jones, decedent, West, was. a passen-
ger in a car driven by Banks. Banks followed closely a truck
driven by Tyree. Tyree got out of his truck, carrying his rifle.
When he tapped the rifle against the window of Banks's vehi-
90. Id. at 433, 448 S.E.2d at 612.
91. Id. at 435, 448 S.E.2d at 612.
92. Id. at 436, 448 S.E.2d at 613.
93. Id. at 435, 448 S.E.2d at 612.
94. Id. at 435, 448 S.E.2d at 613.
95. USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 248 Va. 185, 445 S.E.2d 145 (1994).
96. 248 Va. 437, 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994).
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cle, the rifle discharged, injuring Banks and killing West.97
The insurers of West's vehicle sought a declaratory judgment
that their policies did not provide uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage to West or Banks. The trial court ruled that
they did provide such coverage."
The supreme court reversed. Prior case law required a "nex-
us" between the injury and the uninsured vehicle.9 The court
stressed that insurance policies provide coverage for "vehicle-
caused property losses, personal injuries, and death. Such dam-
ages are not vehicle-caused when the proximate cause is merely
incidental or tangential to the ownership, maintenance, or use
of the vehicle."00 Here, the proximate cause of the wrongful
death was Tyree's criminal assault, not meaningfully related to
the use of the uninsured automobile.1 1
A particularly significant insurance case was State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cuffee."'0 Cuffee was an
action against an uninsured motorist, Sivels, and plaintiffs
uninsured motorist carrier, State Farm. Sivels, through counsel,
admitted liability. The trial court ruled that State Farm accord-
ingly could not present evidence on contributory negligence or
assumption of the risk because that would be inconsistent with
the position of Sivels.0 3 On appeal, the supreme court re-
versed. Section 38.2-2206, the court held, is clear.1°4 The court
applied the plain language of the statute, notwithstanding
plaintiffs argument that to do so would "result in chaos in
97. Id. at 438-39, 448 S.E.2d at 656.
98. Id. at 439, 448 S.E.2d at 657.
99. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 239 Va. 646, 650, 391 S.E.2d 71,
73 (1990).
100. Erie Insurance, 248 Va. at 442-43, 448 S.E.2d at 658-59.
101. Id. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 659.
102. 248 Va. 11, 444 S.E.2d 720 (1994).
103. Id. at 13, 444 S.E.2d at 721.
104. The statute provides:
The insurer shall ... have the right to fie pleadings and take other
action allowable by law in the name of the owner or operator of the
uninsured ...motor vehicle or in its own name. Nothing in this subsec-
tion shall prevent the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle
from employing counsel of his own choice and taking any action in his
own interest in connection with the proceeding.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(F) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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courtrooms below.""5  As the court reminded plaintiff,
"[fiinding ways to control chaos is a daily task of courts every-
where."'
06
e. Contribution
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. United Services Automotive Asso-
ciation,0 7 USAA was the primary insurer and Allstate was
the excess insurer of the defendant in a wrongful-death action.
USAA settled the case for an amount greater than its primary
coverage and called on Allstate to contribute one-half of the
amount over that sum. Allstate refused, USAA then filed suit
against Allstate and recovered a judgment.' 8 The supreme
court reversed because the right to contribution depends on a
common obligation. Here, Allstate had no obligation to provide
coverage under the terms of its policy, which required either a
settlement agreement to which Allstate was a party or a final
judgment against the insured.0 9
f. "Death or Destruction"
In a case of first impression, the supreme court was called
upon to construe the meaning of "death or destruction" of live-
stock for purposes of motor cargo liability coverage in
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Keller."° A truck carry-
ing cattle was involved in an accident, killing several steers
and injuring others. The cattle were visibly injured and lost
weight. Prospective buyers were informed of the cattle's condi-
tion, and as a result the average price per pound of the cattle
at auction was 18.5 percent less than their purchase price a
few days earlier."'
105. Cuffee, 248 Va. at 14, 448 S.E.2d at 722.
106. Id. A few months later, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beng, 249 Va.
165, 455 S.E.2d 2 (1995), the court extended this holding to underinsured motorist
carriers.
107. 249 Va. 9, 452 S.E.2d 859 (1995).
108. Id. at 11, 452 S.E.2d at 860.
109. Id. at 13-14, 452 S.E.2d at 861-62.
110. 249 Va. 458, 456 S.E.2d 525 (1995).
111. Id. at 459, 456 S.E.2d at 525.
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The policy covered "Direct Physical 'Loss' which results in
death or destruction to covered property." The insurance compa-
ny denied that there had been any "destruction" of cattle that
were merely injured in the accident." The supreme court
agreed: "destruction" requires at least that the property be
damaged to such an extent that it becomes useless for its in-
tended purpose."'
g. Independent Medical Examination
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Eaton," Eaton was injured in
an automobile accident. Allstate paid $2,762.97 under her medi-
cal payments coverage, but requested that she undergo an inde-
pendent medical examination before any further payments
would be made. Eaton refused and sued for the remaining pay-
ments. Eaton asserted that because she was contemplating an
uninsured motorist claim, she was justified under section 38.2-
2206" in refusing to undergo the examination."' The trial
court ruled for Eaton, but the supreme court reversed. The
statute has no effect on medical payments coverage, even if a
UM claim either is contemplated or made under the policy."
7
h. Prejudgment Interest
In Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Douthat,"' Douthat was in-
jured in an automobile accident by Dunford. Douthat sued
Dunford and recovered a judgment of $95,000 plus prejudgment
interest. Before the entry of judgment, Dunford's two insurers
paid Douthat their combined policy limits of $100,000. Douthat
then filed a second action against the insurers, seeking the
remainder of the prejudgment interest. The trial court entered
judgment for Douthat in the amount of $27,175.56."'
112. Id. at 460, 456 S.E.2d at 526.
113. Id. at 460-62, 456 S.E.2d at 526-27.
114. 248 Va. 426, 448 S.E.2d 652 (1994).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
116. Eaton, 248 Va. at 429, 448 S.E.2d at 654.
117. Id. at 430, 448 S.E.2d at 654-55.
118. 248 Va. 627, 449 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
119. Id. at 630, 449 S.E.2d at 800.
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The insurers appealed, arguing that they had no obligation to
pay prejudgment interest under their policies.' The supreme
court began its analysis by noting that "[i]f the terms of an
insurance policy do not conflict with any provision of law, the
terms of the contract, as written, will govern and limit the
extent of recovery under the policy.""2 The court noted that
section 8.01-382 provides for discretionary awards of prejudg-
ment interest, but mandatory awards of postjudgment interest.
Thus, the court held, an insurer has no duty to pay prejudg-
ment interest beyond the policy limits, absent a contractual
provision to the contrary.'
i. Stolen Property
In Hall, Inc. v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,'
plaintiff, a used-car dealer, purchased in good faith, for $17,000,
what turned out to be a stolen vehicle. The vehicle was de-
stroyed in a fire at plaintiffs dealership. Plaintiffs insurer
denied coverage for the loss on the grounds that the policy did
not cover the vehicle.' The policy provided that it covered
"[o]nly the private passenger autos [Hall] own[s]. This includes
those private passenger autos [Hall] acquire[s] ownership of
after the policy begins."' The language was clear and unam-
biguous that only someone with legal title "owns" an automo-
bile, and the parties had stipulated that the legal owner was
State Farm, the former owner's insurer. The insurer thus prop-
erly denied coverage. 6
11. Invasion of Privacy
Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins"' involved a
claim of "invasion of privacy" by a very public man. Plaintiff, a
former football player for the Washington Redskins, was di-
120. Id. at 630, 449 S.E.2d at 801.
121 Id. at 631, 449 S.E.2d at 801.
122. Id. at 632, 449 S.E.2d at 801-02.
123. 248 Va. 307, 448 S.E.2d 633 (1994).
124. Id. at 309, 448 S.E.2d at 635.
125. Id. at 308, 448 S.E.2d at 634.
126. Id. at 310, 448 S.E.2d at 635.
127. 249 Va. 387, 457 S.E.2d 356 (1995).
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vorced from his wife in 1991. Soon after that, his ex-wife be-
came a licensed real estate agent with defendant Town &
Country. In 1992, she decided to sell the former marital home.
She had a flyer printed that stated in large, bold type "John
Riggins' former home." Plaintiff had not given his consent to
the use of his name. 8
Plaintiff sued Town & Country for misappropriation of his
name under section 8.01-40(A) 9 as well as other theories. A
jury awarded him compensatory damages of $25,000 and puni-
tive damages of $28,608."0°
On appeal, the supreme court had to decide whether the
placement of plaintiffs name on the flyer constituted use of the
name "for advertising purposes" within the meaning of sec-
tion 8.01-40(A). Following New York cases interpreting a simi-
lar statute, the supreme court said that "a name is used 'for
advertising purposes' when 'it appears in a publication which,
taken in its entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of,
an advertisement or solicitation for patronage of a particular
product or service.',""3 Applying this test, the court held that
plaintiff's name was used for advertising purposes and was not
"merely incidental" to the commercial message of the flyer.'32
128. Id. at 392, 457 S.E.2d at 361.
129. That statute provides:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if dead, of the sur-
viving consort and if none, of the next of kin, or if a minor, the written
consent of his or her parent or guardian, for advertising purposes or for
the purposes of trade, such persons may maintain a suit in equity
against the person, firm, or corporation so using such person's name,
portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also
sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such
use. And if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name,
portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be un-
lawful by this chapter, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary
damages.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
130. Riggins, 249 Va. at 393, 457 S.E.2d at 361.
131. Id. at 395, 457 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Beverley v. Choices Women's Medical
Center, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1991)).
132. Id. at 395, 457 S.E.2d at 363.
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12. Malpractice-Lawyers
In a case of first impression, the court decided in Lyle, Siegel,
Croshaw & Beale, P.C. v. Tidewater Capital Corp.' that con-
tributory negligence is a defense to a claim for legal malprac-
tice. The court already had decided that contributory negligence
is a defense to medical malpractice claims,"M and saw no rea-
son to treat legal malpractice claims differently." 5
In Hendrix v. Daugherty,' plaintiffs sued their former law-
yers for malpractice after their wrongful death suit was dis-
missed pursuant to the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' initial
motion for judgment in the malpractice action alleged the
lawyers' negligence but did not allege that the negligence proxi-
mately caused them injury."13 The trial court properly granted
the lawyers' demurrer. Plaintiffs were allowed to file an amend-
ed motion for judgment, which alleged proximate causation, and
these allegations were sufficient to withstand demurrer."
Generally, the questions of whether an attorney has exercised
the appropriate degree of care and, if not, whether the failure
was the proximate cause of the client's loss, are to be decided
by a fact finder after considering testimony of expert witnesses.
However, when these questions are purely matters of law, they
are reserved for determination by a court and cannot be the
subject of expert testimony. In Heyward & Lee Construction Co.
v. Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller,"9 plaintiff alleged that
defendant law firm had committed malpractice in failing to join
necessary parties to its bill of complaint to enforce two
mechanics' liens. The trial court sustained the law firm's de-
murrer, and the supreme court affirmed.' The law firm had
133. 249 Va. 426, 457 S.E.2d 28 (1995).
134. See Eiss v. Lillis, 233 Va. 545, 552-53, 357 S.E.2d 539, 543-44 (1987); Law-
rence v. Wirth, 226 Va. 408, 412-13, 309 S.E.2d 315, 317-18 (1983).
135. Lyle, Siegel, Croshaw & Beale, 249 Va. at 431, 457 S.E.2d at 32.
136. 249 Va. 540, 457 S.E.2d 71 (1995).
137. Id. at 548, 457 S.E.2d at 76.
138. Id.
139. 249 Va. 54, 453 S.E.2d 270 (1995).
140. Id. at 60, 453 S.E.2d at 274.
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relied upon well-established law and could not have foreseen
that the supreme court would overrule a line of precedent."
13. Malpractice-Medical
a. Damages Cap
The effect on the medical-malpractice damages cap of a set-
tlement with a joint tortfeasor was at issue in Fairfax Hospital
System, Inc. v. Nevitt. Plaintiff, born with birth defects, suf-
fered cardiac arrest five days after undergoing cardiac surgery
at a hospital operated by Inova/Fairfax Hospital System,
Inc.' Plaintiff sued the hospital, Pediatric Cardiology Associ-
ates (PCA), Dr. Mardini, and others. Plaintiff settled with PCA
and Dr. Mardini for $600,000, then took her case against the
remaining defendants to trial.' The jury returned a verdict
of $2,000,000, from which the trial judge subtracted the
$600,000 settlement. The remaining $1,400,000 was then re-
duced to $1,000,000 pursuant to section 8.01-581.15.1' The
supreme court reversed this ruling. The formula applied by the
trial court in effect deprived the hospital of any benefit for the
settlement with PCA and Dr. Mardini. The court held that
when the total amount recovered at trial of the malpractice
action and in all settlements exceeds $1,000,000, the total
amount that the plaintiff can recover is $1,000,000. The set-
tlement credit should have been applied to the $1,000,000 stat-
utory cap, not to the verdict amount, leaving plaintiff with a
judgment of $400,000.'1
b. Expert Testimony
In Fairfax Hospital System, Inc. v. Curtis,47 plaintiff, ad-
ministrator of the estate of an infant who died soon after birth
141. Id. at 59, 453 S.E.2d at 273.
142. 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 (1995).
143. Id. at 593, 457 S.E.2d at 11.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 596-97, 457 S.E.2d at 13; see VA- CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (1994).
146. Nevitt, 249 Va. at 599, 457 S.E.2d at 14-15.
147. 249 Va. 531, 457 S.E.2d 66 (1995).
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at defendant's hospital, sued for negligence. The trial court ad-
mitted the hospital's expert witnesses testimony that the risk of
"near-SIDS syndrome" has some statistical correlation with a
mother's seizures during pregnancy, diabetes, and smoking.'
The trial court, however, refused to admit evidence from the
hospital's expert witness that the risk factors were present in
the infant's mother's prenatal history."" Expert testimony is
inadmissible, the court held, when predicated upon insignificant
statistical possibilities, not probabilities. 5 '
c. Informed Consent
In Rizzo v. Schiller,"5 an infant was injured when the ob-
stetrician, Dr. Schiller, used forceps during delivery. Dr.
Schiller argued that the mother had given her informed consent
to the use of the forceps by signing the following form:
AUTHORIzATION FOR MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES
PATIENT HISTORY No. /P/9456
I hereby authorize Dr. Schiller, and/or other members of the
Medical Staff of The Fairfax Hospital of his choice, to perform
diagnostic or therapeutic medical and surgical procedures on
and to administer anesthetics to Pamela Rizzo . I further au-
thorize The Fairfax Hospital to dispose of any removed tissue
or amputated parts.
11/07/89 [Signed] Pamela S. Rizzo
(Date) (Signature)
[Signed] Vera Thomas
(Witness) (Relationship)'52
148. Id. at 534, 457 S.E.2d at 68.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 535, 457 S.E.2d at 69.
151. 248 Va. 155, 445 S.E.2d 153 (1994).
152. Id. at 157, 445 S.E.2d at 154.
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The Court held that the mother was not sufficiently in-
formed:
[T]his form did not inform her of any specific procedures
that Dr. Schiller intended to perform; nor did it inform her
of foreseeable risks associated with any procedures or risks
in failing to perform any procedures. As Dr. Arner observed,
the form is so general in nature that "you could also justify
amputating her foot." We hold that the duty imposed upon a
physician to obtain a patient's informed consent requires
more than simply securing the patient's signature on a gen-
eralized consent form, similar to the form present here. The
law requires informed consent, not mere consent, and the
failure to obtain informed consent is tantamount to no con-
sent.10
d. Meaning of 'Physician"
In Taylor v. Mobil Corp.,"M decedent, an employee of Mobil,
died of a heart attack after a cardiologist at Mobil's clinic failed
to diagnose decedent's heart disease during examinations in
January and February 1991. During discovery in the wrongful
death action brought by decedent's widow against the cardiolo-
gist (Dr. Johnson) and Mobil, Dr. Johnson discovered that his
license to practice medicine in Virginia had expired on Decem-
ber 31, 1990. Dr. Johnson had inquired about its renewal prior
to its expiration, but the licensing authority erroneously in-
formed him that his license had been renewed. After learning of
the mistake, Dr. Johnson immediately applied for and received
the necessary license.155 Defendants moved for the application
of the medical-malpractice cap of section 8.01-581.15, and the
trial court denied the motion.15 On appeal, the supreme court
153. Id. at 159, 445 S.E.2d at 155-56 (emphasis added).
In Pettengill v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Va. 1994), plaintiff sued
for injuries arising from a bilateral tubal ligation. Plaintiff contended that her doctor
was negligent per se for failing to obtain her written informed consent as required by
§ 54.1-2974. Id. at 381. The court held that this was not negligence per se because
plaintiff was not a member of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was
enacted; § 54.1-2974 was enacted to provide immunity to physicians. Id. at 384.
154. 248 Va. 101, 444 S.E.2d 705 (1994).
155. Id. at 105, 444 S.E.2d at 707.
156. Id.
920 [Vol. 29:897
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
affirmed because the plain language of the statute provides that
it applies to actions against a "health care provider" for "mal-
practice." 7 "Health care provider" is defined in the chapter as
"a person.., licensed by this Commonwealth to provide health
care or professional services as a physician."'58 "Malpractice"
is defined as "any tort based on health care or professional
services rendered or which should have been rendered by a
health care provider, to a patient."'59 "Physician" is defined as
"a person licensed to practice medicine ... in this Common-
wealth."60 Because Dr. Johnson was not licensed when the
cause of action arose in January and February 1991, he was
not a "physician" or "health care provider" for purposes of the
Act, and the plaintiffs action was not one for malpractice with-
in the meaning- of the Act."' If there is to be an exception for
a physician in Dr. Johnson's circumstances, the court concluded,
it will have to be provided by the legislature."2
e. Review Panel
In Fairfax Hospital System, Inc. v. Curtis,63 the trial court
excluded the opinion of the review panel on the grounds that it
was not rendered within six months of the designation of the
panel, as required by section 8.01-581.7:1. The panel had sua
sponte continued the proceedings, thus resulting in the late
issuance of the opinion.' Whether or not the continuance
was influenced by the hospital's actions, the statute is clear
that unless both sides agree, a late opinion is inadmissible. 65
It was also clear that plaintiff had not caused the delay.
157. Id. at 109, 444 S.E.2d at 709-10.
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Taylor, 248 Va. at 109, 444 S.E.2d at 709.
162. Id. at 109, 444 S.E.2d at 710. The court also held that plaintiffs claim was
barred by the Workers' Compensation Act. Taylor's death did not arise out of his
employment because the cause of his injury was not an "actual risk" of employment.
It was not enough that the clinic was located at the place of employment because his
employer did not require or even expect him to use the clinic. Id. at 107, 444 S.E.2d
at 708.
163. 249 Va. 531, 457 S.E.2d 66 (1995).
164. Id. at 538, 457 S.E.2d at 71.
165. Id. at 539, 457 S.E.2d at 71.
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14. Partnerships
A finding that one is a general partner must be based on
proof of the statutory elements required for such status."i In-
troducing evidence that suggests only the trappings of general
partner status cannot create a jury question regarding whether
an individual is a general partner. In Sloan v. Thornton, none
of the statutory requirements was met, and thus there was no
evidence to support a jury finding of general partnership."7
Generally, one partner is not entitled to compensation for
services rendered attending to partnership affairs, unless there
is an express or implied contract for such compensation."s In
Skretvedt v. Kouri, one partner testified that he could not afford
to join forces with a company that would not pay him and that
"$3,000 a month... was discussed in specific terms."'69 The
trial court was justified in finding an implied contract between
the partnership and the defendant for compensation.
Under section 50-17, the liability of an incoming partner for
debts of the partnership incurred before he became a partner
may be satisfied only out of the partnership assets.'7 ° The fed-
eral district court held in Citizens Bank v. Parham-Woodman
Medical Associates171 that this rule applies even when the
partnership receives part of the consideration for the debt after
he becomes a partner.
15. Premises Liability
The supreme court showed some reluctance to approve orders
striking plaintiffs' evidence in Holcombe v. NationsBanc Finan-
cial Services Corp.'72 Plaintiff was employed by a commercial
cleaning service to clean defendant's branch office. Defendant
stored in the bathroom two heavy partitions that had been
166. Sloan v. Thornton, 249 Va. 492, 497, 457 S.E.2d 60, 62 (1995).
167. Id.
168. Skretvedt v. Kouri, 248 Va. 26, 34, 445 S.E.2d 481, 486 (1994).
169. Id.
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-17 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
171. 874 F. Supp. 705, 710 (E.D. Va. 1995).
172. 248 Va. 445, 450 S.E.2d 158 (1994).
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bolted to a wall in another part of the office. The partitions
leaned against the wall in the bathroom, just inside the door.
When plaintiff was cleaning the bathroom one day, the parti-
tions fell on her, causing her injury.'73 Defendant argued that
plaintiff showed no evidence of a defective condition on the
premises.174 The court took defendant's motion to strike under
advisement at the end of plaintiff's case. At the close of all the
evidence, defendant renewed the motion, which was grant-
ed.'75 The supreme court reversed. The evidence was not with-
out conflict. A jury could conclude that it was foreseeable that
injury would result from the storage of the partitions in the
bathroom. 6
Similar judicial reluctance to keep a premises liability case
from the jury was shown in Little Creek Investment Corp. v.
Hubbard.7  Plaintiff tripped over an automobile muffler on
the sidewalk in front of her place of employment while walking
to her car at around ten o'clock in the evening. Plaintiff testi-
fied that she did not look down at the sidewalk, "but looked
straight ahead."'78 Defendant asserted that this was contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law. 79 The trial court dis-
agreed, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the
amount of $300,000.18°
The supreme court, reviewing prior cases, held that there is
no per se rule that a person who does not look down while
walking forward is contributorily negligent; instead, "the
circumstances of each case must be considered."'8' Here, it
was a dark, rainy night, and plaintiff testified that her vision
was obscured by her fellow employees who were walking in
front of her. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly
submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury for
decision. 8'
173. Id. at 446-47, 450 S.E.2d at 159.
174. Id. at 447, 450 S.E.2d at 159.
175. Id. at 447, 450 S.E.2d at 159-60.
176. Id at 448, 450 S.E.2d at 160.
177. 249 Va. 258, 455 S.E.2d 244 (1995).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 261, 455 S.E.2d at 246.
181. Id.
182. Id at 264, 455 S.E.2d at 248. Another premises liability case was Arthur v.
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16. Product Liability
a. Crashworthiness
In a long-awaited decision, the supreme court considered in
Slone v. General Motors Corp."8 whether Virginia law recog-
nizes the concept of "crashworthiness." The opinion, however,
raises as many questions as it answers.
Several federal courts have considered the issue over the past
two decades. All have held or assumed that Virginia would
recognize the crashworthiness doctrine, which requires a manu-
facturer to use reasonable care to design a vehicle that will
protect occupants from an unreasonable risk of injury in rea-
sonably foreseeable collisions."8 Slone did not even mention
any of these cases. Instead, the supreme court swiftly dismissed
the term "crashworthiness": "We have repeatedly articulated the
relevant principles that govern whether a manufacturer of a
product owes a duty to a person injured by that product. We
find no reason to confuse our well-settled jurisprudence by
injecting the doctrine of 'crashworthiness' and, therefore, we
reject this doctrine."1"
The analysis followed in Slone, however, is crashworthiness
in everything but name. Plaintiff was attempting to back a
dump truck up a gravel ramp in order to dump his load at a
depot in Botetourt County. When he was within a few feet of
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 866 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va. 1994). Plaintiff was injured
when she slipped and fell while stepping down from a cashier's island at defendant's
gas station. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case was
submitted to the trial court for decision. Id. at 952. The court found that defendant
was negligent for failing to warn plaintiff of the change in elevation, which was not
open and obvious. The court also found, however, that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent because she stepped up on the island to pay and thus was familiar with
the condition, but proceeded to step down even though she could not see the step. Id.
at 955.
183. 249 Va. 520, 457 S.E.2d 51 (1995).
184. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 (4th Cir. 1974)
(assuming, but not deciding, that Virginia would recognize crashworthiness); Euler v.
American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (W.D. Va. 1992) (predicting
that Virginia would recognize doctrine); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F.
Supp. 1368, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1978) (assuming that Virginia would recognize doctrine).
185. Slone, 249 Va. at 525, 457 S.E.2d at 53.
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the dump site, the ground gave way and the dump truck
flipped over backwards, sliding down the side of the ramp for
about 60 feet. The roof was crushed in the accident. 8 6 Plain-
tiff alleged that the truck should have been designed to with-
stand the rollover."' The trial court granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment on the grounds that there was no
claim for crashworthiness under Virginia law.'" The supreme
court reversed, holding that the case should be allowed to go to
trial because plaintiff should be allowed to show that the roll-
over was a reasonably foreseeable "misuse" of the truck.8 '
b. Disclaimer of Warranty
In Buettner v. R.W. Martin & Sons," plaintiff was injured
by a flatwork ironer that defendant had sold to plaintiffs em-
ployer, SHS. The sales contract between defendant and SHS
provided that the ironer was sold "as is." Plaintiff argued that
the disclaimer of warranties, although effective as to SHS, was
not effective as to her.' The court rejected this argument; a
third-party user can rise no higher than the purchaser through
which he claims.'92 An effective disclaimer that is not uncon-
scionable to the parties to a sales contract cannot be unconscio-
nable to the parties' employees.'93
In Fisher v. Monsanto Co., plaintiffs decedent died of
brain cancer allegedly because of exposure to PCBs. The sale of
the product between Monsanto and decedent's employer,
Westinghouse, disclaimed all warranties other than good title
and production according to specifications. 9 ' Although plaintiff
186. Id. at 523, 457 S.E.2d at 52.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 524, 457 S.E.2d at 53.
189. Id. at 527, 457 S.E.2d at 54-55. Justices Compton and Whiting dissented:
"According to the majority's reasoning, a jury should be permitted to decide that
foreseeably a truck could be negligently driven into water, thus requiring the manu-
facturer to equip the vehicle with pontoons to avoid injury to occupants." Id. at 530,
457 S.E.2d at 56 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
190. 47 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1995).
191. Id. at 118.
192. Id. at 119.
193. Id.
194. 863 F. Supp. 285 (W.D. Va. 1994). PCBs are polychlorinated biphenyls.
195. Id. at 289-90.
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argued that section 8.2-719(3) prohibits such limitations of
liability as to consumer goods, there was no evidence that this
product was a consumer good. 96
c. Notice
In Cole v. Keller Industries,'97 plaintiff was injured on June
15, 1991, while on a ladder manufactured by defendant. Plain-
tiff did not notify defendant of the claim until October 12, 1992.
The court held that section 8.2-607 requires a third-party bene-
ficiary to give reasonable notice of the claim. 8 In 1991,
plaintiffs attorney had obtained the ladder. By early 1992, an
expert had been retained to examine it. On June 27, 1992, the
expert drafted a report explaining the ladder's defects. In light
of the expert's destructive testing of the ladder between June
27 and the notification of defendant on October 12, the three-
and-a-half month delay in notifying defendant was unreason-
able as a matter of law, requiring summary judgment for
defendant."'
d. Open and Obvious
In Austin v. Clark Equipment Co., 2°0 plaintiff, an employee
at a carpet warehouse, was injured while operating a forklift
truck. A "mast" used to carry rolls of carpet on another forklift
struck her in the back and impaled her. The court noted that a
manufacturer is not liable for failing to warn of an "open and
obvious" defect.21' A risk is "open and obvious" if the person
196. Id. at 290. Another federal case held that with regard to industrial (not con-
sumer) products, a warranty disclaimer that is not unconscionable between the seller
and purchaser cannot be unconscionable as applied to a third-party beneficiary of the
warranty. Reibold v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 193, 199 (E.D. Va. 1994).
197. 872 F. Supp. 1470, 1471 (E.D. Va. 1994).
198. Id. at 1472.
199. Id. at 1475. There was a further basis for the court's ruling. Before plaintiff
filed suit, one of his experts examined the ladder and destroyed part of it during the
examination. Id. at 1472. The court held that this destruction of crucial evidence
prejudiced defendant so that summary judgment for defendant was required. Id. at
1473.
200. 48 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 1995).
201. Id. at 836.
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using the product is or should be aware of the risk."2 A
warning is therefore superfluous because the user is or should
be aware of the risk. It should have been obvious to plaintiff
that the forklifts were not equipped with the safety devices (au-
dible motion alarms, rearview mirrors, and flashing lights) that
plaintiff alleged were needed.0 3 It also should have been obvi-
ous that the masts on the forklifts could obstruct forward vi-
sion.'"
17. Wrongful Death
In Mann v. Hinton,0 5 decedent had died in 1990, leaving
his wife, his father, and two stepchildren. Under the version of
section 8.01-53 in effect at the time of death, the stepchildren
were not statutory beneficiaries" 6 By the time of trial in
1992, however, the statute had been amended. The supreme
court held that any person who is a beneficiary as defined in
the statute at the time that the verdict is entered is entitled to
recover.
207
C. Affirmative Defenses
1. Collateral Estoppel
In Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,2°8 Angstadt
sued Rask and Multicomm, Rask's employer, for personal inju-
ries. Atlantic, Multicomm's liability carrier, insured both de-
fendants. Rask failed to attend his deposition, and the trial
court entered a default judgment as to liability against both
defendants. Atlantic informed the defendants that they had
breached the cooperation clause of the policy and refused to
defend them further. Angstadt recovered $1,650,000 in compen-
satory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages. 29 Atlantic
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 249 Va. 555, 457 S.E.2d 22 (1995).
206. Id. at 562, 457 S.E.2d at 27.
207. Id. at 563, 457 S.E.2d at 27.
208. 249 Va. 444, 457 S.E.2d 86 (1995).
209. Id. at 446, 457 S.E.2d at 87.
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then filed a declaratory judgment action against Angstadt,
Rask, and Multicomm, seeking a ruling that Rask's failure to
obey a court order in the tort suit established a failure to coop-
erate.21 The trial court entered judgment for Atlantic, but the
supreme court reversed, reasoning that this was not a case for
collateral estoppel, as there was no identity of parties or issues,
nor was there mutuality.21'
In Glasco v. Ballard," plaintiff was walking down a street
in Ashland when a police officer pulled alongside him, suspect-
ing that he had stolen some items from a nearby store. The po-
lice officer saw "a shiny, metallic, oblong object and a plastic-
wrapped object" in plaintiffs front jacket pocket. The officer
pulled his gun and stepped out of his car to question plaintiff.
The police car began to roll forward, and the officer leaned into
it and put his foot on the brake pedal and put the gear shift
into park. While the officer was doing this, his pistol accidental-
ly discharged, striking plaintiff in the neck.21
Plaintiff filed suit against the officer in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The federal court granted summary judgment for
defendant on the ground that the firing of the pistol was an
accidental act.2"4 Plaintiff then filed a second action in the
Circuit Court of Hanover County, alleging negligence and as-
sault and battery. The circuit court granted summary judgment
for the officer on the basis of collateral estoppel and sovereign
immunity.215
The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
court affirmed the trial court's order on the assault and battery
claim reasoning that the federal court already had decided that
the shooting was not an intentional act.21 6 The court also
agreed that sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claim unless
the officer was grossly negligent.2 7 Plaintiff was not, however,
210. Id.
211. Id. at 447, 457 S.E.2d at 87-88.
212. 249 Va. 61, 63, 452 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1995).
213. Id. at 63, 452 S.E.2d at 855.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 64, 452 S.E.2d at 855-56.
217. Id. at 64-65, 452 S.E.2d at 856.
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collaterally estopped from arguing that the officer was grossly
negligent. The court therefore remanded the case for further
proceedings on that issue."
In Horton v. Morrison,9 Morrison and Horton were drivers
of cars involved in an accident. Horton and her son, Shaver,
sued Morrison for her injuries. In response to Shaver's action,
Morrison filed a third-party motion for judgment against
Horton. Horton fied no responsive pleadings, and Morrison
obtained a default judgment.22 ° Morrison then filed a plea of
res judicata and a motion to dismiss Horton's action, which the
trial court granted: Horton's liability "ha[d] been adjudicated
when judgment was granted on behalf of Ms. Morrison against
Ms. Horton in the third party action filed in [Shaver's]
case."
221
The supreme court reversed. Res judicata did not apply be-
cause Horton's action against Morrison for personal injuries was
not the same cause of action as Morrison's third-party action
against Horton for contribution.2  Collateral estoppel also did
not apply. The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that the
issue have been actually litigated in a previous action: "the
requirement that an issue must have been the subject of actual
litigation, rather than potential litigation, is one of the features
that distinguishes collateral estoppel from res judicata."21
Horton's liability was never actually litigated.
2. Illegal Act
Trotter v. Okawa was a claim for damages arising out of
a sexual relationship between plaintiff and his psychotherapist,
Okawa. Plaintiff sued Okawa, Okawa's supervisor, and George
Washington University, where Okawa was employed. Plaintiff
alleged "gross breach of professional duty, misconduct and gross
negligence" on the part of all defendants as a result of Okawa's
218. Id. at 65, 452 S.E.2d at 856.
219. 248 Va. 304, 448 S.E.2d 629 (1994).
220. Id. at 305, 448 S.E.2d at 630.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 306, 448 S.E.2d at 630.
223. Id. at 306, 448 S.E.2d at 631.
224. 248 Va. 212, 445 S.E.2d 121 (1994).
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actions, failure of the supervisor and the University to monitor
Okawa, and the failure of all defendants to provide him proper
treatment.2" Defendants demurred on the grounds that
plaintiffs participation in an illegal act (fornication) barred the
action.22
The supreme court distinguished Zysk v. Zysk22" and Miller
v. Bennett" by noting that plaintiff alleged that he had par-
ticipated in the act of sexual intercourse under duress and
coercion caused by Okawa's "exploitative treatment" of him."
This brought the allegations within the "fraud or duress" ex-
ception to Zysk.23°
3. Limitations
a. Accrual
The accrual of a cause of action was the subject of several
recent decisions. In Lo v. Burke,"' plaintiff sued for wrongful
death as a result of her mother's death from cancer. Decedent
had been treated by Dr. Lo, a radiologist. On September 1,
1988, decedent underwent a CT scan for the purpose of investi-
gating a possible liver tumor. Dr. Lo read the results of the CT
scan to decedent but did not observe, though the CT scan
showed, that she had a three-centimeter cyst on her pancreas.
On April 29, 1991, Dr. Lo performed another CT scan on dece-
dent and this time observed the cyst, which had grown to five
centimeters. The cyst was surgically removed and found to be
malignant. Decedent died on November 8, 1991.2
Plaintiff filed a notice of claim under section 8.01-581.2 on
February 19, 1992. He filed his motion for judgment against
Dr. Lo and his employer on June 18, 1992. Defendants pled the
two-year statute of limitations under section 8.01-244, but the
225. Id. at 214, 445 S.E.2d at 123.
226. Id. at 215, 445 S.E.2d at 123.
227. 239 Va. 32, 404 S.E.2d 721 (1990).
228. 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949).
229. Trotter, 248 Va. at 216, 445 S.E.2d at 124.
230. Id.
231. 249 Va. 311, 455 S.E.2d 9 (1995).
232. Id. at 313, 455 S.E.2d at 11.
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trial court denied the plea.2" The trial court also denied mo-
tions for summary judgment and post-trial motions based on
the limitations defense.' The supreme court affirmed the tri-
al court. The burden is on the defendant to prove the necessary
facts to prevail on a plea of the statute of limitations." The
statute began to run when decedent sustained her injury, de-
fined as a "positive, physical, or mental hurt." 6 Decedent suf-
fered injury only when the cancer developed, and there was no
evidence showing when that occurred. Defendants accordingly
failed to meet their burden of proof.13 The court noted that it
was not applying a "discovery" rule.'
In Bullion v. Gadaleto,239 the federal district court held that
an action for breach of a physician's or psychologist's duty of
confidentiality does not accrue when the plaintiff learns of the
breach, but when any injury, such as damage to reputation or
relationship, results from the unauthorized disclosure. Plaintiff
need not know of the injury for the cause of action to ac-
crue.N0
McHenry v. Adams"' involved the allegedly improper burial
of plaintiff's mother. The mother died on April 15, 1988, and
was buried on April 19, 1988, in a casket supplied by
Rappahannock Vault Company. On July 15, 1988, plaintiff
began to notice strange conditions around his mother's grave.
He saw holes in the ground "about six inches in diameter" and
flies coming from one of the holes.1 2 On July 18, 1988, plain-
tiff complained of the conditions to the local health department
and the Virginia Department of Health Professions. At a later
time, one of the principals of Rappahannock inspected the
gravesite and reported to plaintiff that nothing was wrong. On
233. Id. at 314, 455 S.E.2d at 11.
234. Id. at 315, 455 S.E.2d at 11-12.
235. Id., 455 S.E.2d at 12 (citing Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 958,
275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, 168,
144 S.E. 456, 457 (1928)).
236. Id. at 315-16, 455 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting Locke, 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at
904).
237. Id. at 317, 455 S.E.2d at 12.
238. Id. at 317, 455 S.E.2d at 13.
239. 872 F. Supp. 303, 307 (W.D. Va. 1995).
240. Id.
241. 248 Va. 238, 448 S.E.2d 390 (1994).
242. Id. at 240, 448 S.E.2d at 391.
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March 20, 1990, however, plaintiff had the casket disinterred.
On examination, it was found that the vault leaked and that
there was water in the casket. Plaintiff alleged that he had
been told that the vault was waterproof."
Plaintiff filed suit against Rappahannock, the funeral home,
and several of their owners and employees on August 9, 1990,
seeking damages for the "unlawful invasion of his right to af-
ford his mother a proper burial" as recognized in Sanford v.
Ware.' The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of plaintiffs motion for judgment based on the statute of limita-
tions." Whether a one-year or two-year statute applied,
plaintiffs cause of action accrued at the latest on July 22, 1988,
when he made the complaints after discovering the conditions
at the gravesite. Plaintiff argued that the statute was tolled by
the defendants' "ongoing campaign" of concealment, but he was
bound by his own testimony about his discovery of the problem
in July 1988.
b. Continuing Undertaking
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia in Harris v. K&K Insurance Agency: "Does the continuing
undertaking doctrine apply to insurance agents and agen-
cies?"247 The court said no, noting that it had applied the doc-
trine only in cases involving a "continuous or recurring course
of professional services related to an undertaking."" The ser-
vices provided by an insurance broker and insurance agency for
an insured do not fit this definition.249
In Pidgeon v. Wake,25 a Virginia circuit court held that for
the continuing treatment rule to apply, (1) there must be a
continuous course of treatment with the defendant health-care
243. Id. at 240-41, 448 S.E.2d at 391.
244. 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950).
245. McHenry, 248 Va. at 244, 448 S.E.2d at 393.
246. Id. at 243-44, 448 S.E.2d at 393.
247. 249 Va. 157, 160, 453 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1995).
248. Id. at 161, 453 S.E.2d at 286.
249. Id. at 162, 453 S.E.2d at 286-87.
250. 34 Va. Cir. 336, 339 (Winchester City 1994).
932 [Vol. 29:897
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
provider; and (2) the treatment must be for the same or related
ailments. Where plaintiff received treatment at defendant
hospital by physicians who were not employees of the hospital,
the first prong of the test was not satisfied, and therefore,
plaintiff never had a physician-patient relationship with the
hospital. 1
4. Workers' Compensation/Statutory Employer
25 2
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Hazelwood,253 plaintiff
sued his supervisor and his employer for assault and battery
and negligent hiring arising out of several "goosings" that plain-
tiff received from another employee. The employer, invoking the
workers' compensation bar, asserted that "goosing" was a regu-
lar activity in the pressroom and was a way for the employees
to let off steam.2' The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the employer's motion to set aside the verdict,
holding that an injury does not arise out of employment if the
assault is personal to the employee and not directed against
him as an employee or because of the employment. 25 The evi-
dence in this case showed that the goosing was personal in
nature and not motivated by business concerns.5
In Lichtman v. Knouf,25 7 plaintiff sued her employer and
fellow employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress
as a result of repeated acts of harassment over a one-year peri-
od. The trial court held that her claims were barred by the
Workers' Compensation Act under Haddon v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.5 8  The supreme court reversed, overruling
251. Id. at 340-42.
252. For a more detailed analysis of Employment and Workers' Compensation Law
over the past year, see Paul G. Beers, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Employment
Law, 29 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1027 (1995), Wood W. Lay and Bruin S. Richardson, III,
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Workers' Compensation, 29 U. RIcH. L. REV. 1199
(1995).
253. 249 Va. 369, 370-71, 457 S.E.2d 56-57 (1995).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 372-75, 457 S.E.2d at 58-59.
256. Id. at 375, 457 S.E.2d at 59.
257. 248 Va. 138, 139, 445 S.E.2d 114, 114 (1994).
258. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990).
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Haddon and holding that gradually incurred injuries are not
"injuries by accident" for purposes of the Act.259
In Lipsey v. Case,26 ° plaintiff was employed as a working
student on a farm owned by the Cases, where she took care of
and trained horses. Plaintiff was injured when a Doberman
pinscher belonging to her co-worker, Post, bit her. Assuming
that plaintiff was an employee and that the accident occurred
in the course of her employment by the Cases, the court held
that the accident did not arise out of her employment. "An
accident arises out of the employment when it is apparent to a
rational mind, under all attending circumstances, that a causal
connection exists between the conditions under which the work
is required to be performed and the resulting injury."26' Here,
plaintiffs work in taking care of horses could not reasonably
have exposed or subjected her to the danger of being bitten by
a co-worker's pet dog.262
D. Pleading, Practice and Procedure
1. Arbitration
The extent of an arbitrator's authority was at issue in Trust-
ees of Asbury United Methodist Church v. Taylor & Parrish,
Inc.26 The Asbury United Methodist Church contracted with
Taylor & Parrish, Inc. ("Taylor"), for a construction project.
After a dispute arose over a change order that Taylor issued,
the church sought a declaratory judgment that the change order
was invalid." Taylor moved for an order compelling arbitra-
tion pursuant to section 8.01-581.02(A), and the trial court
granted the motion.265 The arbitrator ruled that the change
order was invalid, but awarded Taylor $263,310.97 on a quan-
tum meruit theory, which was approved by the trial court.266
259. Lichtman, 248 Va. at 140, 445 S.E.2d at 115.
260. 248 Va. 59, 60, 445 S.E.2d 105, 106 (1994).
261. Id. at 61, 445 S.E.2d at 107.
262. Id. at 61-62, 445 S.E.2d at 107.
263. 249 Va. 144, 452 S.E.2d 847 (1995).
264. Id. at 147, 452 S.E.2d at 849.
265. Id. at 148, 452 S.E.2d at 849.
266. Id. at 150, 452 S.E.2d at 850-51.
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The supreme court reversed, reasoning that "[a]rbitrators
derive their authority solely from the parties' contractual agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract. Thus,
arbitrators exceed the scope of their authority when they pur-
port to act beyond the terms of the contract from which they
draw their authority."267 The parties' contract provided that a
change order must be "signed by the Owner," which the invalid
change order was not.2" Claims relating to the change order
were thus beyond the arbitrator's authority to decide.269
2. Demurrer
In Concerned Taxpayers v. County of Brunswick,7 ' citizens
filed two bills of complaint challenging the County's action in
approving the construction of a landfill and recycling center.
The trial court sustained the County's demurrers to both bills
of complaintY.2 ' The supreme court affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, stating that "[w]hile a demurrer admits as true
all averments of material facts which are sufficiently pleaded, it
does not admit the correctness of the conclusions of law stated
by the pleader."2' Even assuming that the facts pleaded were
true, they did not support a conclusion that the County acted
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unlawfully. 3
3. Election
In Hendrix v. Daugherty,274 plaintiffs sued for legal mal-
practice and alleged that defendant attorneys wrongfully
nonsuited their wrongful death action (which was later held
barred by the statute of limitations) and failed to prosecute a
survival cause of action. The court held that these causes of
action are inconsistent. A person may not recover under the
267. Id. at 153, 452 S.E.2d at 852.
268. Id. at 154, 452 S.E.2d at 852.
269. Id. at 154, 452 S.E.2d at 852-53.
270. 249 Va. 320, 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995).
271. Id. at 325, 455 S.E.2d at 715.
272. Id. at 326, 455 S.E.2d at 715.
273. Id.
274. 249 Va. 540, 542, 457 S.E.2d 71, 72-73 (1995).
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survival statute and the wrongful death statute. 75 Plaintiffs
are required to elect one of the two theories after discovery has
been completed.276
4. Joinder
The supreme court continued to follow the common-law rule
against misjoinder of causes of action in Powers v. Cherin.2 "
Powers was injured in an automobile accident when her vehicle
was struck by Pope and was treated by Dr. Cherin for her
injuries. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Cherin's treatment was mal-
practice and caused her further injury. 8 Powers brought suit
against Pope and Cherin in one action. Cherin demurred on the
basis of misjoinder of parties and causes of action, and the
court granted the demurrer. 79
The supreme court affirmed. Although section 8.01-272 allows
a party to join tort and contract claims and section 8.01-281(A)
allows a party to plead alternative facts and theories of recov-
ery against alternative parties, both statutes require that all
such claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.'
Here, Powers sought recovery not only for injuries suffered in
the accident, but also for different injuries caused by Dr.
Cherin's alleged malpractice. The court concluded that these
injuries did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence,
and the trial court properly granted the demurrer.28'
5. Nonsuit
In Albright v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co.,282 plain-
tiff had sued defendant twice previously and nonsuited both
cases. Defendant demurred to the present motion for judgment.
The trial court sustained the demurrer and allowed plaintiff
275. Id. at 546-47, 457 S.E.2d at 75-76.
276. Id.
277. 249 Va. 33, 452 S.E.2d 666 (1995).
278. Id. at 36, 452 S.E.2d at 668.
279. Id. at 37, 452 S.E.2d at 669.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 38, 452 S.E.2d at 668-69.
282. 249 Va. 463, 457 S.E.2d 776 (1995).
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leave to amend contingent on paying defendant's attorney's fees
in the nonsuited actions.2" The supreme court held that this
was error. Section 8.01-380(B) does not authorize an assessment
of attorney's fees in an action subsequent to the nonsuited ac-
tion, nor does it give the trial court the right to condition the
filing of an amended motion for judgment on the payment of
such fees.'
In Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving,
Inc.,' plaintiff filed an action in state court against the de-
fendants. After the state court dismissed several of the counts
in the motion for judgment, plaintiff took a nonsuit" 6 When
plaintiff reified the action in federal court, defendants argued
that the dismissal of the counts in the first suit was the law of
the case, and the district court agreed." 7 The Fourth Circuit
rejected this argument, holding that a nonsuit under Virginia
law operates on the entire cause of action, even as to those
counts that have been dismissed at the time of the nonsuit.28
6. Pleading
In Sloan v. Thornton,2 9 plaintiff proffered two instructions
based on theories of liability that were not pleaded or otherwise
identified at any time before the defendant moved to strike
plaintiffs evidence. The supreme court held that the trial court
properly refused these instructions since a court may not enter
judgment on a right not pleaded and claimed.290
283. Id. at 466, 457 S.E.2d at 777.
284. Id.
285. 37 F.3d 1053 (4th Cir. 1994).
286. Id. at 1056.
287. Id. at 1057.
288. Id. at 1058-59. On remand, defendant obtained summary judgment again. See
Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., Civ. No. 93-378-A (E.D. Va.
Feb. 10, 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-1662 (4th Cir. Feb. 27, 1995).
289. 249 Va. 492, 495, 457 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1995).
290. Id. at 500, 457 S.E.2d at 64.
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7. Sanctions
In Concerned Taxpayers v. County of Brunswick,291 citizens
challenged the County's approval of a proposed landfill and
recycling center on the grounds that the County did not comply
with the Public Procurement Act. The trial court granted the
County's demurrer and imposed sanctions.292 The supreme
court affirmed reasoning that there is no common law right of
action to enforce the Public Procurement Act."' The trial
court dismissed the bill on January 3, 1994, and expressly re-
served jurisdiction to consider an award of sanctions, which it
made on March 31, 1994. The supreme court held that the trial
court had jurisdiction to award sanctions."4
E. Trial Proceedings and Evidence
1. Burden of Proof
In Gossett v. Jackson,295 plaintiff, then fourteen years old,
was injured when a car that defendant, then seventeen years
old, was driving hit a telephone pole. The car did not belong to
plaintiff or defendant, although they were using it with permis-
sion. Defendant had been driving sixty mph in a twenty-five
mph zone. After the accident, it was discovered that many of
the items beneath the hood were held together by nylon ropes
and bungee cords. The trial court granted defendant's motion to
strike on the grounds that plaintiffs did not show how the acci-
dent occurred.296 The supreme court reversed, stating that
there was evidence from which the jury could infer that
defendant's negligence caused the accident: defendant stopped
several times minutes before the accident, which tended to
show that the brakes were functioning. In addition, defendant
291. 249 Va. 320, 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995). See Public Procurement Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (1994).
292. Concerned Taxpayers, 249 Va. at 324, 455 S.E.2d at 714.
293. Id. at 331, 455 S.E.2d at 718.
294. Id. at 334, 455 S.E.2d at 720.
295. 249 Va. 549, 457 S.E.2d 97 (1995).
296. Id. at 552, 457 S.E.2d at 99.
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took his hands off of the steering wheel as it was weaving
moments before the collision.
2 97
In Mann v. Hinton,29 ' decedent was killed while riding a
bicycle on a public road. Defendant's truck passed decedent
immediately before decedent was found dead next to a tele-
phone pole. Plaintiff argued that defendant's truck either
passed too close to decedent, causing him to run off the road, or
struck decedent as it passed him. 299 The supreme court held
that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of negligence.0 0
The two factual theories were not mutually contradictory: both
rested on the premise that defendant passed too closely.''
2. Evidence-Business Records
In Kettler & Scott, Inc. v. Earth Technology Cos.,"0 2 an engi-
neering firm sued a former client for services rendered. Plaintiff
had kept lab data on computer. When the computer system was
being "improved," the program that sorted plaintiffs' data was
destroyed, resulting in a jumble of data. Defendant refused to
pay plaintiff without adequate documentation.0 3  At trial,
plaintiff introduced into evidence a ninety-one-page computer
printout and a summary of billing records prepared by
plaintiffs data processor and billing specialist? °
On appeal, defendant argued that the computer data did not
qualify under the shopbook rule."0 5 The supreme court dis-
agreed reasoning that under the facts of this case, the data and
summaries had a "circumstantial guarantee of trustworthi-
ness."
306
297. Id. at 553, 457 S.E.2d at 99-100.
298. 249 Va. 555, 457 S.E.2d 22 (1995).
299. Id. at 557, 457 S.E.2d at 23.
300. Id. at 561, 457 S.E.2d at 26.
301. Id. at 562, 457 S.E.2d at 26-27.
302. 248 Va. 450, 449 S.E.2d 782 (1994).
303. Id. at 455, 449 S.E.2d at 785.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 457, 449 S.E.2d at 785.
306. I& at 449 S.E.2d at 785-86.
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3. Evidence-Dead Man's Statute
In Vaughn v. Shank, °7 Vaughn went to live with Conner at
age twelve as a foster child. Vaughn lived there until she mar-
ried in 1976. Conner died in 1990, leaving Vaughn nothing in
her will. Vaughn alleged that Conner orally agreed to leave
Vaughn and her daughter a certain house, used as a nursing
home, if Vaughn would live there and perform certain du-
ties."' Under section 8.01-397, testimony against the executor
of an estate must be corroborated with evidence that tends in
some degree to support some essential allegation or issue raised
by the pleadings and testified to by the surviving witness,
which allegation or issue, if unsupported, would be fatal to the
case." 9 Here, the corroboration consisted of testimony that
Conner had said that she would give Vaughn and her daughter
the house and that the house was purchased for Vaughn and
her daughter.3 10 The court ruled that this testimony was con-.
sistent with an intent to make a gift and did not corroborate
plaintiffs claim of an oral contract.31'
4. Evidence-Internal Rules
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence typically govern in
diversity cases, there are circumstances in which a question of
admissibility of evidence is so intertwined with a state substan-
tive rule that the state rule will be followed in order to give
full effect to the state's substantive policy. An example of this
is Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp.3" In Hottle, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that Virginia's exclusion of the internal rules of an
entity to fix the standard of its duties in order to prove negli-
gence, as expressed in Pullen v. Nickens3'2 and Virginia Rail-
307. 248 Va. 224, 445 S.E.2d 127 (1994).
308. Id. at 226-27, 445 S.E.2d at 128-29.
309. Id. at 229, 445 S.E.2d at 130. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol.
1992).
310. Vaughn, 248 Va. at 228-29, 445 S.E.2d at 130.
311. Id. at 230, 445 S.E.2d at 130.
312. 47 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
313. 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983).
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way & Power Co. v. Godsey," is sufficiently bound up with
state policy to require its application in federal court.315
5. Evidence-Miscellaneous
Brooks v. Bankson" arose out of a contract for the sale of
a house. During the walk-through inspection, the buyers ob-
served what they thought were defects and refused to go for-
ward with the purchase. The sellers then sued the buyers for
breach of contract. Over the sellers' objection, the buyers intro-
duced evidence at trial of the conditions observed during the
walk-through. The sellers also introduced evidence of their own
regarding the condition of the house. The jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the buyers.1 7 On appeal, the buyers argued
that the sellers had waived any objections to the admissibility
of the walk-through testimony by introducing similar evidence
themselves.1 8 The supreme court, however, found no waiver:
The rule of Snead invoked by the Buyers is well settled,
but before it will be applied, "'there must be some reason-
able and just foundation for holding that there was in fact
a waiver." Whitten v. McClelland, 137 Va. 726, 742, 120
S.E. 146, 150 (1923) (quoting Washington-Virginia Ry. v.
Deahl, 126 Va. 141, 151, 100 S.E. 840, 844 (1919)). The rule
will not be applied in distortion of its purpose. Id. Here, the
Sellers made known to the trial court their objections to the
court's interpretation of the contract, and to its evidentiary
ruling predicated on that interpretation. In order to meet
the Buyers' evidence of the condition of the crawl space in-
troduced pursuant to these rulings, the Sellers were entitled
to present evidence of their own on the same subject."
314. 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E. 1072 (1915).
315. Hottle, 47 F.3d at 110.
316. 248 Va. 197, 445 S.E.2d 473 (1994).
317. Id. at 202, 445 S.E.2d at 476.
318. Id. at 207, 445 S.E.2d at 478. See Snead v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 787, 121
S.E. 82 (1924).
319. Brooks, 248 Va. at 207, 445 S.E.2d at 478-79.
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6. Jury
a. Misconduct
The jury in Robertson v. Metropolitan Washington Airport
Authority.. violated the judge's instructions not to deliberate
until the evidence was concluded and the parties had made
their closing arguments. Plaintiff alleged that she was injured
when she stepped into a pothole in the parking lot at National
Airport. The evidence was concluded in one day of trial, and
the judge instructed the jury not to discuss the case with any-
one overnight."' On the morning of the second day of trial,
before closing arguments were to begin, the jury handed the
judge a note that contained several questions about the evi-
dence in the case.322 Plaintiff moved for a mistrial, but the
court denied the motion. Instead the court admonished the jury
to consider the arguments of counsel fully.2 ' The supreme
court affirmed, ruling that the jury had not made up its mind,
but was merely asking for more information about the case."u
The judge therefore had no duty to investigate further into the
pre-closing deliberations, especially when plaintiff did not move
for any further investigation."
b. Selection of Jurors
The supreme court applied the bar against race-based pe-
remptory strikes to condemnation proceedings in Common-
wealth Transportation Commissioner v. Thompson."6 When
counsel for the landowner was asked to explain why he had
struck the only two black commissioners, he responded:
If Your Honor please, for the record, upon inquiry I stat-
ed that my reason for doing it was strategic, tactical and
320. 249 Va. 72, 452 S.E.2d 845 (1995).
321. Id. at 74, 452 S.E.2d at 846.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 76, 452 S.E.2d at 847.
325. Id. at 76-77, 452 S.E.2d at 847.
326. 249 Va. 292, 455 S.E.2d 206 (1995).
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instinctive, and it still is. And I would state for the record
it had not one scintilla of racial motivation in it.32
The trial court accepted this explanation, but the supreme court
reversed." The proffered explanation was "vague, ambiguous,
and conclusional, and is insufficient to rebut a prima facie case
of racial discrimination in the removal of the commission-
ers."
329
7. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Cooper v. Horn,33 ° plaintiffs sued for property damage
caused when defendants' earthen dam burst during a severe
storm. Plaintiffs prevailed at trial, recovering compensatory and
punitive damages.33' The supreme court reversed on, among
other grounds, the giving of an instruction on res ipsa loqui-
tur.332 Plaintiffs could not rely on res ipsa loquitur because
they did not claim or even attempt to show that they were
powerless to ascertain the cause of the dam's failure or that the
cause was accessible only to defendants.33 In addition, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only when the instrumen-
tality that caused the injury is exclusively within the control of
the defendants.3 ' Here, the flood water was the instrumental-
ity and one of its causes was the water flowing into the dam
from a stream, which was beyond defendants' exclusive con-
trol.33
327. Id. at 294, 455 S.E.2d at 207.
328. Id.
329. Id at 297, 455 S.E.2d at 208. But see Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771
(1995) (opponent of strike has burden of proving that a race-neutral explanation is a
pretext for discrimination).
330. 248 Va. 417, 448 S.E.2d 403 (1994).
331. Id. at 421, 448 S.E.2d at 405.
332. Id. at 425, 448 S.E.2d at 408.
333. Id. at 422, 448 S.E.2d at 406.
334. Id. (citing Danville Community Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 757, 43
S.E.2d 882, 887 (1947)).
335. Id.
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F. Appellate Practice
1. Preservation of Error
In eight cases, the supreme court refused to address issues
on appeal that were not included in the assignments of er-
ror.
336
2. Scope of review
Under section 8.01-680, the trial court's decision will be up-
held unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 3 7 When the
trial court hears the evidence ore tenus, its findings based on
an evaluation of the testimony are entitled to the same weight
as those of a jury. In Hudson v. Hudson,338 the plaintiff
sought to invalidate a deed of gift on the grounds that plaintiff
was a prior creditor of decedent and that decedent was ren-
dered insolvent by the conveyance. The supreme court reversed
the trial court and refused to invalidate the deed because there
was no evidence to support the trial court's ruling that dece-
dent was rendered insolvent by the conveyance. 39
3. Statement in Lieu of Transcript
In White v. Morano,3 plaintiff sued defendant for legal
malpractice in prosecuting her slip-and-fall case. Defendant pre-
vailed at trial, where fifteen witnesses testified and a court
reporter, retained by defendant, was present.34' Plaintiff prop-
336. See Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 381, 457 S.E.2d 36, 39
(1995); Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 368, 457 S.E.2d 42, 50 (1995); Mann v.
Hinton, 249 Va. 555, 564 n.2, 457 S.E.2d 22, 27 n.2 (1995); Williams v. Garraghty,
249 Va. 224, 239, 455 S.E.2d 209, 218 (1995); Powers v. Cherin, 249 Va. 33, 35, 452
S.E.2d 666, 667 (1995); Faizi-Bilal Intl Corp. v. Burka, 248 Va. 219, 222, 445 S.E.2d
125, 126 (1994); Black v. Eagle, 248 Va. 48, 57, 445 S.E.2d 662, 666-67 (1994); Ham-
ilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 248 Va. 40, 44, 445 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1994).
337. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-680 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
338. 249 Va. 335, 336, 455 S.E.2d 14, 15 (1995).
339. Id. at 342, 455 S.E.2d at 18.
340. 249 Va. 27, 452 S.E.2d 856 (1995).
341. Id. at 29, 452 S.E.2d at 857.
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erly noticed her appeal, but did not obtain a transcript; instead,
she prepared a twenty-one page written statement in lieu of
transcript pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court Rules.' De-
fendant objected to the written statement as inaccurate and
incomplete. The trial court refused to certify it for several rea-
sons: (1) the trial lasted two days, and the judge could not
remember all the testimony; (2) fifteen witnesses testified, and
he could not recall the details of their testimony; (3) the court
reporter was present and working during trial, so the judge had
not felt that he had to take meticulous notes; and (4) the state-
ment mischaracterized matters of pretrial procedure as
"facts." m
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial judge's refusal to
certify the statement was impermissible under Supreme Court
Rule 5:11(d). The supreme court affirmed, ruling that the word
"shall" in Rule 5:11(d) is directory in meaning, not mandato-
ry. The burden is on appellant to secure a transcript or to
prepare a proper statement of the trial proceedings.' The
court reporter is under the control of the court' and could
have assisted plaintiff in preparing a written statement, had
plaintiff made such a request. Therefore, the trial judge did not
err in refusing to sign the statement. 47
G. Settlement
The binding nature of an oral settlement was clarified in
Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger.' Plaintiffs legal malprac-
tice action was submitted to a mediator. At the mediation,
plaintiff was represented by counsel and did not indicate any
disagreement with any statements made by her counsel. A
'"Mediation Memorandum of Agreement" was prepared that
resolved certain issues. Five days later and the day before trial,
further settlement discussions occurred at which, according to
342. Id. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:11(c)(1).
343. White, 249 Va. at 30, 452 S.E.2d at 858.
344. Id. at 32, 452 S.E.2d at 859.
345. Id.
346. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:3.
347. White, 249 Va. at 32, 452 S.E.2d at 859.
348. 249 Va. 376, 457 S.E.2d 36 (1995).
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defendants, plaintiff agreed to a full settlement. Pursuant to
this agreement, plaintiffs' counsel appeared in court the next
day and consented to orders dismissing the litigation with
prejudice.349 When her attorneys presented the plaintiff with
settlement papers the next day, she said that she had discussed
the matter with one of her expert witnesses and was having
second thoughts about settlement.50 Plaintiffs' new attorneys
then moved to vacate the dismissal orders, and plaintiffs'
original attorneys moved to withdraw.35' The trial court grant-
ed the motion to withdraw, but denied the motion to vacate the
dismissal orders, finding that plaintiff had agreed to the settle-
ment.
352
The supreme court found ample factual evidence to support
the trial court's finding that plaintiff had agreed to the settle-
ment. When a competent party makes a settlement and acts
affirmatively to enter into the settlement, the party's second
thoughts about the wisdom of the settlement do not constitute
good cause for setting it aside.353
H. Miscellaneous-Prejudgment Interest
Ordinarily, prejudgment interest is not allowed when ac-
counts are unliquidated and disputed between the parties3 5
Nevertheless, whether interest should be awarded, and from
what date interest should run, are matters within the sound
discretion of the trial court.355 In Skretvedt v. Kouri,3" a
partnership dispute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award plaintiff prejudgment interest.
349. Id. at 386, 457 S.E.2d at 41.
350. Id. at 384, 457 S.E.2d at 41.
351. Id. at 380, 457 S.E.2d at 38.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 385, 457 S.E.2d at 41.
354. See, e.g., Stearns v. Mason, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 484, 494 (1874).
355. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
356. 248 Va. 26, 445 S.E.2d 481 (1994).
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III. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL PRACTICE
The General Assembly enacted a number of measures during
its 1995 Session that affect litigation in state courts.357 For
ease of reference, the discussion of these enactments is classi-
fied below by subject matter.
A. Removal
A new section 8.01-127.1 (Removal of residential unlawful
detainer actions) was added. It provides for removal to the
circuit court of any case involving a residential tenancy not
involving a default in rent on the filing of an affidavit of sub-
stantial defense and the payment of the writ tax and costs
accrued to the time of removal.3s8
B. Immunity
Section 8.01-47 (Immunity of school personnel investigating
or reporting certain incidents) was amended to immunize school
principals or their designees who make reports of certain un-
lawful activities to local law-enforcement officials as required by
§ 22.1-280.1.359
C. Limitation of Actions
A new section 8.01-247.1 (Limitation on action for defama-
tion, etc.), was added. It provides that every action for injury
resulting from libel, slander, insulting words, or defamation
357. Unless otherwise noted, all provisions became effective on July 1, 1995.
358. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-127.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
359. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-47 (Cum. Supp. 1995). An amendment to § 22.1-280.1
provides:
The principal or his designee shall promptly report to local law-
enforcement officials all incidents occurring on school property involving
(i) the assault and battery against school personnel, the maiming, death,
shooting or stabbing of any person or the intentional cutting or wounding
of a person by another, (ii) a controlled substance, or (iii) the illegal
carrying of a firearm onto school property.
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-280.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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shall be brought within one year after the cause of action ac-
crues.5 ° The Supreme Court of Virginia had previously held
that defamation was subject to the one-year catch-all limitation
period.36' The same bill amended the catch-all statute, sec-
tion 8.01-248 (Personal actions for which no other limitation is
specified), to provide that every personal action accruing on or
after July 1, 1995, for which no limitation is otherwise pre-
scribed shall be brought within two years after the right to
bring such action has accrued. 62
D. Multiple Claimant Litigation
The General Assembly enacted an ambitious "Multiple Claim-
ant Litigation Act" to provide for joinder, coordination, consoli-
dation, or transfer of multiple claimant litigation.363 The Act
is a vehicle for management of the "mass disaster" case."
The circuit court may enter an order 'joining, coordinating,
consolidating or transferring civil actions" upon a finding that:
1. Separate civil actions brought by six or more plaintiffs
involve common questions of law or fact and arise out of
the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences;
2. The common questions of law or fact predominate and
are significant to the actions; and
3. The order (i) will promote the ends of justice and the
just and efficient conduct and disposition of the actions, and
(ii) is consistent with each party's right to due process of
law, and (iii) does not prejudice each individual party's
right to a fair and impartial resolution of each action.365
360. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-247.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
361. See, e.g., Watt v. McKelvie, 219 Va. 645, 248 S.E.2d 826 (1978); Weaver v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 199 Va. 196, 98 S.E.2d 687 (1957).
362. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
363. Id. §§ 8.01-267.1 to -267.9 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
364. Similar acts have been passed in other states. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 404.1-404.8 (West 1995); COLO. R. Civ. P. 42.1; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-242 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223, § 2A (West 1986); N.H. SUPER
CT. R. 113; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 602 (Law. Co-op. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-2-27
(1985); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 42; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 805.05 (West 1994).
365. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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The Act also provides for separate or bifurcated trials of certain
issues," special interrogatories to the jury,36 ' binding of lat-
er-filing plaintiffs by previous proceedings in the multiple-claim-
ant litigation (to the extent consistent with due process),"
and interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, at the discretion of the appellate courts. 69
Section 8.01-374.1 (Consolidation or bifurcation of asbestos
cases) was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1995. The General
Assembly has removed that language from the statute, which
now has no sunset provision."'
E. Workers' Compensation
The General Assembly made several changes to the defini-
tions contained in the Workers' Compensation Act. The defini-
tion of "injury" was amended to provide that it does not include
any injury, disease, or condition resulting from an employee's
voluntary participation in employer-sponsored off-duty recre-
ational activities that are not part of the employee's duties."1'
The definition of "employee" was amended to include members
of volunteer search and rescue organizations and volunteer
emergency medical technicians. 72
F. Exhibits
Section 8.01-452.1 (Disposal of exhibits in civil cases) was
amended to allow the clerk to donate exhibits of concluded
cases after the appeal has expired and on notice to the own-
er. 3 Previous law had only allowed disposal of the exhibits.
366. Id. § 8.01-267.6 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
367. Id.
368. Id. § 8.01-267.7 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
369. Id. § 8.01-267.8 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
370. Id. § 8.01-374.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
371. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
372. Id
373. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-452.1.
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IV. CHANGES IN THE VIRGINIA COURT RULES
A. Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rules
A number of changes of interest to litigators were enacted in
Parts 5 and 5A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
during the past year:
Rule 5:20 (Denial of appeal; petition for rehearing) was
amended to increase the number of copies of the petition to be
filed from eight to ten."4
Rule 5A:6 (Notice of appeal) was amended to require a party
filing a notice of appeal of right to the Court of Appeals to file
simultaneously in the trial court an appeal bond in compliance
with section 8.01-676.1.37
5
Rule 5A:16 (Perfection of appeal; docketing) was amended to
clarify that the appeal bond is filed in the trial court.378
B. Medical Malpractice Rules
Several changes were made to the Medical Malpractice Rules
of Practice:
Rule 3 (Designation of panel; certificate of parties) was
amended to provide that the judge presiding over the panel
need not attend or participate in the deliberations. 7 The
Rule was also amended to add to the list of health care provid-
er members 10 clinical social workers, 10 professional counsel-
ors, and 10 dental hygienists.378
Rule 6 (Conduct of an ore tenus hearing) was amended to
provide that the judge presiding over the panel need not attend
or participate in the deliberations.379
374. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:20.
375. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5A6(a).
376. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A=16(a).
377. VA. MED. MAL. R. 3(b).
378. VA. MED. MAL. R. 3(d)(13)-(15).
379. VA. MED. MAL. R. 6(j)(13).
